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Equity Trading Practices and Market Structure: 
Assessing Asset Managers' Demand for Immediacy 
BY NICHOLAS ECONOMIDES AND ROBERT A. SCHWARTZ 
This paper summarizes the responses to a questionnaire sent to equity traders through 
TraderForum of the Institutional Investor. The respondents manage in total avery significant 
percentage of equity assets under management-in the ~nitedStates. The focus of the 
questions was the extent of the demand for immediate execution of orders. We found that 
the majority of traders an willing to trade patiently if this reduces execution costs. Many 
traders indicate that they frequently delay mdes to obtain better prices. Most respondents 
indicate that they are typically given more than a day to implement a large order. that they 
typically break up more than 20% of their large orders for execution over time. and that 
they regularly take more than a day for a large order that has been broken into lots to be 
executed completely. There is a generally positive view of alternative electronic trading 
systems, such as Instinet and Investment Technology Group's POSIT. The key motives for 
trading on these systems arc reduced market impact, lower spreads. better liquidity, and 
anonymity. The respondents indicate that the key changes that would make alternative 
elecmnic systems more attractive are an increase in execution rates and more convenient 
times of trading. The responses to the survey also show that alternative electronic systems 
would be wd more if the traders did not have soft dollar arrangements. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Practitioners and students of the securities markets widely assume that traders 
demand immediate execution of their orders. Indeed, a major function of tradi- 
tional brokerldealer firms is to provide the services that result in trades being made 
huickly. In volatile markets, an advantage of trading quickly is that opportunity 
costs (i.e., the risk of an asset's price "getting away" before a portfolio decision 
is implemented) are reduced. However, higher direct costs (i.e., market impact, 
bid-ask spreads, commissions, and other transaction costs) are generally incurred 
when fast executions are obtained. Little information exists about the relative 
importance professional asset managers attach to these two types of costs, and 
about the tradeoffs they are willing to make between them. The current survey is 
motivated by this lack of information. 
The results show that experienced participants often do not trade with maximum 
possible speed so as to "nail down" a price, and that they do commonly work their 
orders patiently over time. However, the very dynamics of the continuous market 
appear to induce a demand to trade quickly. Based on the survey responses, we 
conclude that traders would be even more willing to forgo immediacy of execution 
if, by so doing, their direct costs of transacting could be further reduced. 
Consequently, the survey findings have a major implication for market struc- 
ture. Asset managers should be given the opportunity to delay their orders until 
predetermined points in time at which they may trade with each other at reduced 
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trading cost. The incorporation of an electronic call market would provide the 
requisite environment. A call market is an environment that enables buyers and 
sellers to meet at pre-determined points in time. We have elsewhere considered 
the desirability of holding an electronic call three times a day, along with contin- 
uous trading.' The call environment would provide a useful pricing device for 
the broad market, while resulting in lower transaction costs (bid-ask spread and 
market impact) for individual participants. 
In recent years, increasing numbers of institutional investors are breaking out 
of traditional molds to explore various proprietary trading systems (PTS). With 
the exception of Instinet's continuous market, the PTSs are crossing networks 
(e.g., Instinet's after hours cross and Investment Technology Group Inc.'s POSIT 
system) and call markets that are capable of independent price discovery (e.g., 
the Arizona Stock Exchange's AZX system). Nevertheless, immediacy continues 
to be a major service provided by market centers such as the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq. These market centers operate on the assumption 
that participants want instant access to the market, and that they are willing to pay 
the price for trading with immediacy. 
However, little empirical evidence exists on asset managers' demand for im- 
mediacy. To assess this demand, 825 questionnaires were mailed to traders of 
managed equity funds, and 150 responses were received. These respondents r e p  
resent approximately $1.5 trillion in equity assets under management. In broad 
sweep, the responses to the survey suggest that buy-side participants do trade 
patiently in an attempt to control execution costs. The key results include: 
Two-thirds of the respondents indicated that they are willing to trade pa- 
tiently to reduce execution costs (Table 2). 
Nearly half say they frequently do delay trades in an effort to obtain better 
prices (Table 3). 
One-third would regularly or frequently accept a trading delay of one hour 
for a $50 stock if they could save 256 per share in trading costs (Table 4). 
Nearly a quarter would regularly or frequently accept a trading delay of 
three hours for a $50 stock if they could save 259 per share in trading costs 
(Table 5). 
About one in five would regularly or frequently accept a trading delay of 
one hour for a $50 stock if they could gain anonymity on a trade of 10,000 
shares or more (Table 6). 
Nearly two-thirds regularly or frequently use limit orders (Table 8). 
One-third report that 20% or more of their orders for a stock are larger than 
the stock's average daily trading volume (Table 15). 
More than two-thirds typically give more than one day to implement a large 
order for a small cap stock (Table 16). 
'See. Economides and Schwartz (1995). 
Equio Trading Practices and Marker Structure 3 
More than half typically give more than one day to implement a large order 
for a large cap stock (Table 16). 
Approximately three out of five break up at least 20% of their orders for 
100,000 shares or more for execution over a series of trades (Table 17). 
Close to half report that they regularly or frequently take more than one 
day to completely execute a large order broken into lots (Table 18). 
The picture that emerges is that immediacy is not commonly demanded by buy- 
side participants, and that executions for large orders are generally not realized 
within brief periods of time (a few hours or less). Respondents appear to be less 
concerned about trading quickly than about controlling execution costs, the loss 
of anonymity, and the information leakage that occurs when an intermediary is 
contacted. Understanding this is essential for making proper decisions with regard 
to the structure and regulation of our security markets. 
We do not claim that immediacy is never demanded. For specific institutions and 
specific situations, the advantages of rapid trading may indeed outweigh the costs 
involved. Our objective, however, is not to assess the intensity with which most 
asset managers, or even the representative asset manager, demands immediacy. 
Rather, we wish to determine whether or not a meaningful number do handle a 
substantial proportion of their orders patiently because immediacy is costly. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section I1 discusses the relationship between 
market structure and the demand for immediacy. In this section we also present 
our reasons for believing that immediacy is not universally demanded. Section ID 
-discusses the respondents willingness to accept trading delays. In section N, we 
present findings regarding trading practices, order size, and transaction costs. In 
section V, we discuss attitudes towards the use of alternative electronic trading 
systems. Section VI discusses the sample of respondents and their reasons for 
trading. Section W discusses the differences between active and passive traders 
in their responses to the questionnaire. Section VIII contains our concluding 
remarks. The Appendix presents the distributed questionnaire. 
II. MARKET STRUCTURE AND THE DEMAND FOR IMMEDIACY: 
A REVIEW OF THE ISSUES 
An understanding of participants demand for immediacy is key to designing the 
trading structure of a securities market. In this sectio~ we review alternative market 
structures, consider the relationship between market structure and the demand for 
immediacy, and briefly review the literature. A major choice in trading design is 
between a continuous market and a call market A continuous market is open for 
an extended span of time; e.g., at the New York Stock Exchange trading begins at 
9:30 and continues until the 4 p.m. close. During this period, trades are made any 
-time two contra-side orders cross in price. The continuous market can be a dealer 
market (quote-driven) or an agencylauction market (order-driven). Nasdaq in the 
U.S. and SEAQ in the U.K. are dealer markets. Examples of the agencylauction 
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market include the New York Stock Exchange, the Paris Bourse, the Toronto Stock 
Exchange, and the Tokyo Stock Exchange? 
The continuous market has been widely studied by academic researchers. Much 
of the microstructure literature has focused on the dealer market. Early analyses 
include Garman (1976), HO and Stoll(1980), Amihud and Mendelsohn (1980), 
and Mildenstein and Schleef (1983): An analysis of the agencylauction market is 
provided in Cohen, Maier, Schwartz, and Whitcomb (1986) and Schwartz (1$1).~ 
In contrast with a continuous market, orders are batched in a call market for 
simultaneous, multilateral execution at a single price, the value that maximizes 
the number of shares that trade at the call. Examples of call markets include the 
opening procedure on most electronic exchanges (e.g., Toronto's CATS, Paris's 
CAC, and Tokyo's CORES), and on non-electronic exchanges such as the NYSE. 
Pure electronic call markets include the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, the Bolsa Mexi- 
cans's Intermediate Market, the Arizona Stock Exchange, and the Paris Borse (for 
\e;ss Qpu;\d issues), Preuious\y, n&ecton'~c cd\s ex'lsted in%\ Aviu, Pasis, and 
roughly 100 years ago at the NYSE. Call markets have received significantly less 
'attention than continuous markets in the academic literature. Studies of the call 
market include Cohen and Schwartz (1989), Economides and Schwartz (1995), 
Schwartz (1996), and Amihud and Mendelson (1985). 
In comparison with continuous trading, the call market has distinct advantages 
as a trading environment. These include enhanced price discovery, el ination of 
the bid-ask spread, reduced market impact of large orders, superior handling of 
limit orders and, in general, easier order handling and better market surveillance? 
An often-noted disadvantage of call market trading is that it does not provide 
immediate access to the market over an extended period of time.6 However, this 
is  not a problem if call market trading is integrated with continuous trading? 
Nevertheless, if multiple calls are held during a trading day, one might question 
whether or not a sufficient number of participants will postpone their orders so that 
the intraday calls may be viable. Traders will postpone orders or not depending 
on their demand for immediacy and on the price of immediacy in a continuous 
market. 
Clearly the selI side of the market has a vested interest in supplying immediacy. 
It is difficult in a continuous market for ultimate buyers and sellers to find each 
2~ontinuous markets may also include a dealer, such as the specialist on the New York Stock 
Exchange. 
'For further discussion and references, see Schwartz (1991). 
'Furthu refmncu are provided in both of these books. 
%r funher discussion of call markets, see Economides and Schwarrz (1995). The role of liquidity 
in financial exchange is discussed in Economides (1993). (1995). For an analysis of positive size 
effects of financial and other networks see Economides (1996). 
6Econornides and Siow (1988) and Garbade and Siber (1976). (1979) analyze the cost of longer 
waiting until execution and balance it with the benefit of participating in a more liquid market. 
. 'For further discussion of the integration of call and continuous trading see Handa and Schwartz 
(1996). Economides and Heisler (1995). 
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other quickly without the services of brokerldealers. However, when a meeting 
point in time is pre-specified (i.e., the time of a call), buyers and sellers can more 
easily find each other without the services of intermediaries. The key question is, 
"are buy-side traders willing to wait?" 
We anticipate that an appreciable number of them will answer "yes". Cer- 
tainly, the pace with which trading progresses in a continuous market is not in 
harmony with the pace with which the underlying investment decisions are com- 
monly made.8 Institutional decision making with respect to fundamental infor- 
mation takes time. Investment decisions commonIy involve information gathering 
and analysis, and the entire process can take place over a period of several days. 
But once a decision has been made, an order is typically brought to a continuous 
trading environment that accentuates the importance of minutes and even seconds. 
T i e  is suddenly of the essence. Is it likely that the value of a decision made 
over a period of a day or more can decay within the span of an hour or less? 
Or, is the demand for immediacy generated endogenously by the dynamics of the 
continuous market? Certainly part of the demand for immediacy comes from the 
price dynamics of the continuous market Rapid trading may be motivated by 
knowledge of the order flow and by charting signals. 
Regarding the fundamental determinants of share value, we distinguish two 
types of information release: natural (e.g., an earthquake or fire) and managed 
(e-g., an unemployment or earnings report). The introduction of a call market 
would enable the pace at which managed information is released and portfolio 
decisions are made to be better harmonized with the pace at which trading is 
pursued. That is, both news releases and institutional investor portfolio decisions 
could be timed with reference to the schedule of the calls. 
The conventional wisdom is that immediacy is provided by acontinuous market. 
On the contrary, the continuous market may actually make it more difficult for 
institutional investors to execute large orders at reasonable cost by the end of a 
-trading day. Data collected by the Plexus Group indicate that roughly 67% of the 
orders given to buy-side trading desks are for more than half of the stocks' average 
daily trading volumes, and 40% of the orders are for more than the total average 
daily trading volume for the stocks? Orders of this size cannot be traded quickly 
in the continuous market at acceptable levels of cost. The reality is that immediacy 
is not always obtained in a continuous market. 
It is also conventionally believed that intermediaries provide buy-side partic- 
ipants with anonymity vis-a-vis each other. And they do. However, buy-side 
participants are increasingly concerned about the loss of anonymity to sell-side 
t~rokerldealers. It is also becoming apparent that anonymity can be provided by 
an electronic trading system, and it certainly is characteristic of call market trad- 
8 ~ h e  pace of trading in a continuous market has accelerated with the application of information 
technology. 
9 ~ e e  Wagner and Edwards (1993). 
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ing. We expect that buy-side participants will be willing to forsake immediacy for 
disintermediation and anonymity. 
All things considered, picture an institutional investor who makes a portfolio 
decision at 2 p.m. when a market call is scheduled for the 4 p.m. close. The 
investor could avoid paying the price of intermediation and immediacy by waiting 
two hours and trading at lower cost at the 4 p.m. close. By waiting, he or she 
has effectively unbundled the act of "trading" from the "immediacy" of the trade. 
If enough participants do this, they will naturally meet without the assistance of 
intermediaries, and the intra-day calls will be viable. 
The archetypal role of a dealer is to provide the liquidity that enables investors to 
trade with immediacy. "Immediacy," however, is a vague concept. For retail-sized 
orders, it could mean the ability to trade within a few minutes. Large institutional 
orders, however, would incur unacceptably large execution costs (bid-ask spread 
plus market impact) if executed so quickly. An asset manager seeking to buy 
100,000 shares of a stock that on average trades 200,000 shares a day, might 
consider an execution obtained within an hour or even a day to be immediate. This 
section of the paper contains our findings with regard to various issues concerning 
the patience with which a respondent is willing to seek a trade. 
The first issue we address concerns the meaning of immediacy itself: how 
quickly must a trade be made to be considered immediate? Respondents were also 
asked what they would be willing to pay for immediacy, and how frequently they 
do in fact delay a trade in an attempt to obtain a better price. Respondents were also 
asked about their willingness to accept a trading delay to reduce their trading costs 
or to gain anonymity. The extent to which index options andtor futures are used 
so that shares may be traded more patiently in the cash market, and the frequency 
with which limit orders are used also are reported here. 
With regard to the meaning of immediacy, we asked respondents if they would 
consider a trade to be immediate if it executed within a stated period of time 
(Table 1). The majority (71%) answered that a trade must be realized in under 10 
minutes to be considered immediate. Only 3% answered %thin 2 hours," and 
6% said "within one day." 
Having established a sense of what the respondents consider "immediacy" to be, 
the questionnaire asked about the respondents' willingness to trade patiently if 
their execution costs could be reduced by doing so ('Table 2). A total of 67% 
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Table 1: Time In Which You Consider A Trade To Be Immediate 
Table 2: Willingness To Trade Patiently To Reduce Execution Costs 
Under 10 minutes 
1 Hour 
2 Hours 
1 Day 
Other 
No Answer 
indicated that they would be willing or very willing to delay a trade if it reduced 
their costs. Only 8% said they would not be willing. 
Number of Respondents 
107 
1 
4 
9 
7 
1 
5 (Very Willing) 
4 
3 
2 
1 (Not at All Willing) 
No Answer 
Willingness is one thing; the perception of how frequently a trade is delayed is 
another. Therefore, the questionnaire asked how frequently traders in fact delay a 
trade in an attempt to obtain a price that is more favorable than the price currently 
prevailing on the market (TabIe 3). The vast majority (77%) of respondents said 
they delay trades in hopes of finding a better price for 25-75% of their trades. 
Only 11% said they "never" or "rarely" delay a trade for a better price. The 
preponderance of the respondents perceive it desirable to trade patiently. 
Percentage of Respondents 
71.3 
3 
2.7 
6.0 
4.7 
0.7 
WILLINGNESS TO ACCEFT A TRADING DELAY OF ONE HOUR FOR A $50 STOCK 
-IF You COULD SAVE 254 PER SHARE IN TRADING COSTS 
Number of 
Respondents 
5 1 
50 
34 
6 
6 
3 
Evidence on the demand for immediacy was also obtained by asking respondents 
whether they would be willing to accept a trading delay of one hour if, by so doing, 
Percentage of 
Respondents 
34.0 
33.3 
22.7 
4.0 
4.0 
2.0 
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Table 3: The Frequency With Which A Trade Is Delayed To Obtain A Price More 
Favorable Than The Current Market Price 
Table 4: Willingness to Accept A Trading Delay Of One Hour For A $50 Stock If 
You Could Save 25# Per Share In Trading Costs 
they could decrease trading costs by 25# a share for a $50 stock (Table 4). One 
in four respondents said they would "rarely" or "never" delay a trade for an hour 
to reduce costs. On the other hand, more than half said they would be willing to 
delay a trade to reduce costs on some or all of their trades. 
Equity Trading Practices and Market Structure 9 
Table 5: Willingness to Accept A Trading Delay Of 3 Hours For A $50 Stock If 
You Could Save 25$ Per Share In Trading Costs 
WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A TRADING DELAY OF 3 HOURS FOR A $50 STOCK 
You COULD SAVE 2% PER SHARE IN TRADING COSTS 
Traders were then asked if they would accept a delay of three hours for the same 
-cost savings. One in three respondents said they would rarely, if ever, delay a 
trade three hours. On the other hand, an appreciable subset (23%) said they would 
accept a three-hour delay regularly or frequently to save 25 cents per share for a 
$50 stock. 
Jtespondents were also asked if they would delay a trade of 10,000 shares or more 
for one hour if, by so doing, they could gain anonymity (Table 6). Slightly less 
than half of the respondents said they would "rarely" or "never" delay a trade 
for an hour to gain anonymity. But 19% said they would do so "regularly" or 
"frequently." This indicates that an appreciable subset of participants commonly 
do not seek to trade immediately to preserve anonymity. 
How FREQUENTLY OU WAIT MORE THAN ONE DAY BEFORE ACQUIRING OR 
SELLING SHARES IN THE CASH MARKET IF YOU HAVE USED B ~ E X  O ~ O N S  
AND/OR FUTURES TO TRADE QUICKLY 
One way to delay trading in the cash market is to trade a derivative contract to 
establish a position that is then converted into shares over time. Table 7 shows the 
responses from those that indicated that they use index options andlor futures to 
reduce their need to execute trades quickly in the cash market. These respondents 
were asked the frequency with which they would wait more than a day before 
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Table 6: Willingness To Accept A One Hour Trading Delay To Gain Anonymity 
On A Trade Of 10,000 Shares Or More 
Table 7: How Frequently You Wait More Than One Day Before Acquiring Or 
Selling Shares In The Cash Market If You Have Used Index Options And/or 
Futures To Trade Quickly 
acquiring or selling the desired shares in the cash market. A total of 46% said 
they rarely or never wait. On the other hand, a significant number (27%) said they 
"ffequently" waited. 
Never 
Rarely (1-2496 Trades) 
Sometimes (2549% of Trades) 
Regularly (50-74% of Trades) 
Frequently (75-100% of Trades) 
No Answer 
How O m  DO YOU USE LIMIT ORDERS, MARKET ORDERS, AND MORE 
In Table 8, we report on the frequency of the use of limit orders, market orders, 
percentage orders, and basket or&rs. As expected, market, limit, and not held 
orders are all widely used, and in roughly similar amounts. Basket orders and 
'index optiondfutures are not used very much. 
Perhaps the most interesting finding is the extent to which l i t  orders are 
used: 52% of the respondents said they used them on at least half of their trades. 
The use of limit orders is essential to an order driven market. The dynamics of 
price behavior apparently compensates traders sufficiently for placing limit orders. 
Number of 
Respondents 
12 
3 
4 
2 
9 
3 
Percentage of 
Respondents 
36.4 
9.1 
12.1 
6.1 
27.3 
9.1 
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Traders are explicitly not demanding or paying for immediacy when they use limit 
orders in seeking to trade. 
IV. TRADING PRACTICES, ORDER SIZE, AND TRANSACTION COSTS 
Trading practices, order size, and costs shed further light on the willingness of 
the respondents to trade patiently. The first question raised is the importance of 
the major costs of these three categories: the opportunity cost of missing a price, 
market impact, and commissions. Reasons to execute a trade quickly include the 
volatility of prices, the possible mispricing of stocks, and the prevention of front 
running. The costs associated with limit orders (e.g., the risk of non-execution 
and the difficulty of withdrawing limit orders quickly) also impact the decision 
to trade quickly. Respondents were further questioned as to their concern about 
information leakage when a broker is called, and about the frequency with which 
they demand capital from a broker for a block order. Attitudes toward costs are 
also reflected in the respondents' answer to one other question, "How frequently 
do you decide not to adjust your portfolio because the market is too illiquid?" 
Concerning the size of their orders, respondents were asked about the frequency 
with which an order for a stock is larger than the stock's average daily trading 
volume, the time commonly given by portfolio managers to implement large orders, 
and the frequency with which large orders are broken up for execution over time. 
They were further questioned about the frequency with which it takes more than 
one day for a large order broken into lots to execute completely. Lastly, the 
questionnaire asked about the times of the day when the traders most prefer and 
least prefer to place their orders. 
How IMPORTANT ARE THE FOLLOWING COSTS? 
Regarding the costs of trading, our findings on the importance of three major 
components (the opportunity costs of missing a price, market impact, and com- 
missions) are summarized in Table 9. The opportunity costs of missing a price are 
rated the most important cost by 55% of traders, followed by market impact, which 
i s  rated the most important cost by 41% of traders. Commissions are important to 
only 3% of the respondents. 
Table 10 summarizes the most important and second most important factors that 
may cause traders to want to execute a trade quickly. The most important factor 
is "because prices are volatile and the risk of waiting is too greats'48% of re- 
spondents said this was the most important factor, and 32% said it was the second 
most important factor. Fewer indicated that the prevention of front-running was a 
12 Nicholas Economides and Robert A. Schwartz 
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Table 9: How Important Are The Following costs? 
factor: 11% indicated it was the most important factor, and another 26% indicated 
it was the second most important factor. Interestingly, only 23% said that the most 
important factor was that other traders will realize that the stock is overpriced or 
underpriced, and 21% indicated this was the second most important factor. To the 
extent that trading is motivated by news and not just the assessment of existing 
information, this number would be expected to be higher. 
Opportunity Costs 
of Missing A Price 
Market Impact 
Commissions 
WHAT DO YOU CONSIDER THE MOST IMPORTANT AND THE SECOND MOST IM- 
PORTANT DRAWBACKS OF USING LIMIT ORDERS? 
When asked what they consider the most important drawback of using limit orders 
(Table 1 I), most of the respondents (70%) stated that the most important factor is 
the risk of non-execution. An additional 22% checked a closely related factor: limit 
orders may cause you to miss a favorable market movement. Only 4% indicated 
that the drawback is that the limit orders may be difficult to withdraw quickly. This 
i s  not surprising, given that the professional buy-side traders keep current about 
market events, and that order handling procedures are rapid. The response here 
is consistent with the previously discussed finding that price volatility is the most 
important motivation for trading quickly (see Table 10). 
Percentage of Respondents 
Indicating Particular Cost as 
A willingness to delay a trade on the part of roughly a third of the respondents 
.in order to achieve anonymity is evidenced by the responses reported in Table 6. 
Anonymity may be valued by buy-side participants because of the adverse price 
impact that can occur when news gets out that they are seeking to trade. To assess 
this, respondents were asked how concerned they are about information leakage 
after they have called a broker to make a trade. The results are reported in Table 12. 
A total of 45% indicated they were concerned about information leakage. 
Most 
Important 
54.7 
40.7 
3.3 
Neutral 
Neutral 
36.0 
51.3 
9.3 
Least 
Important 
6.0 
6.7 
84.7 
No Answer 
3.3 
1.3 
2.7 
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Table 10: What Are The Most Important And Second Most Important Factors 
That May Cause You To Want To Execute A Trade Quickly? 
I I SecondMost I 
and the Risk of Waiting is Too I I I 
Because Prices Are Volatile 
- - - - . . - - - . - - 
Most Important Factor I Important Factor 
72 I 48 
Traders Will Realize the Stock I I I 
Great 
Becuase you Think Other 
48.0% 
35 
is Overpriced or Underpriced 
No Answer 
0.7% 5.3% 
32.0% 
32 
Opportunity Costs 
To Prevent Other Traders 
From Front-Running Your 
Order 
ONote that columns in this table add to more than 100% becuase some repondents have checked 
more than one category. 
23.3% 
34 
%o primary functions of intermediaries are (i) to help a customer find the coun- 
terpart to a trade (i.e., act as a broker), and (ii) to provide capital as the counterpart 
in a trade (i.e., act as a dealer). For a customer who is concerned about infor- 
mation leakage, a strong motive must exist for contacting the intermediary in the 
first place. Accordingly, the survey asked about the frequency with which the 
respondents demand capital from their brokers for transactions of 10,000 shares 
or more. The results are reported in Table 13. Approximately three out of four 
respondents said they rareIy, if ever, demand capital fiom their brokers. Only 7% 
said they regularly or frequently demand broker capital. Presumably this means 
that the role of intermediaries in finding the other side of a trade is more important 
than their role in providing capital. 
21.3% 
47 
11.3% 
17 
11.3% 
26.0% 
39 
26.0% 
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Table 11: What Do You Consider The Most Important And The Second Most 
Important Drawbacks Of Using Limit Orders? 
'Note that columns add to more than 100% because some respondents have checked more than 
one category. 
- Table 12: Concern About Information Leakage When A Broker Is CaIIed 
How F R E Q U E ~ Y  DO YOU DECIDE NOT TO ADJUST YOUR P o r n o m  BECAUSE 
THE hhiWET IS TOO U Q U I D ?  
5 (Very Concerned) 
4 
3 (Neutral) 
2 
1 (Not Concerned) 
No Answer 
A total of 16% of the traders do not adjust their portfolio 10-19% of the time 
because the market is too illiquid (Table 14). Almost twice as many do not adjust 
a e i r  portfolio for the same reason 1-9% of the time. In both cases, active traders 
are more likely not to adjust their portfolios than passive traders. 
Number of Respondents 
46 
22 
47 
15 
18 
2 
Percentage of Respondents 
30.7 
14.7 
31.3 
10.0 
12.0 
1.3 
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Table 13: Frequency With Which Capital Is Demanded From A Broker For Trans- 
actions of 10,000 Shares or More 
Table 14: How Frequently Do You Decide Not To Adjust Your Portfolio Because 
The Market Is Too Illiquid? 
FREQUENCY WITH WHICH YOUR ORDER FOR A STOCK IS LARGER THAN THE 
STOCK'S AVERAGE DAILY TRADING VOLUME 
If the order is large relative to average daily trading volume, it may not be possible 
10 execute the order entirely in a very short period of time without incurring an 
unacceptably high execution cost. As noted above, Wayne Wagner and Mark 
Edwards found that 66% of the orders in Plexus Group's data set exceed half of 
the stock's average daily trading volume, and that 40% of the orders exceed the 
stock's total average daily trading volume. 
The respondents were asked the frequency withwhich their orders for a stock 
are larger than the stock's average daily trading volume (Table 15). Almost a third 
of the respondents answered that 20% or more of their orders are this large. 
. 
Never 
27 
22.7% 
9 
37.5% 
37 
24.7% 
Active Traders 
Passive Traders 
All Respondents 
1-9% 
40 
33.6% 
6 
25.0% 
47 
31.3% 
10-19% 
17 
14.3% 
1 
4.2% 
24 
16.0% 
20% or 
more 
5 
4.2% 
1 
4.2% 
6 
4.0% 
Don't 
Know 
24 
20.2% 
7 
29.2% 
34 
22.7% 
No 
Answer 
6 
5.0% 
0 
0.0% 
8 
5.3% 
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Table 15: Frequency With Which Your Order For A Stock Is Larger Than The 
Stock's Average Daily Trading Volume 
In light of the size of institutional orders relative to average daily trading volume, 
the questionnaire asked about the time a portfolio manager might typically give 
a trader to implement an order (Table 16). For small cap stocks, less than 1% 
answered "one hour or less:' and 69% answered "one day" or longer. For large 
cap stocks, 5% answered "one hour or less," and 59% answered "one day" or 
ionger. This finding reinforces the impression that asset managers do not attempt 
to implement their trading decisions within brief intervals of time. 
Never 
1-9% of Orders 
10-19% of Orders 
7 
20% or More of Orders 
Don't Knowmot Sure 
No Answer 
FREQUENCY WITH WHICH LARGE ORDERS (100,000 SHARES OR MORE) ARE 
BROKEN INTO SMALLER LOTS FOR SEPARATE XECUTIONS OVER AN EXTENDED 
PERIOD OF TIME 
If an order is given time to be executed, it might be broken up for execution in 
smaller pieces over a series of trades. The questionnaire asked the frequency with 
which large orders of 100,000 shares or more are in fact broken up for this purpose 
(Table 17). More than three out of five respondents indicated that 20% or more of 
their orders are broken into smaller lots. Only 5% indicated that they never break 
up their large orders. 
Number of 
Respondents 
5 
5 1 
33 
49 
8 
4 
FREQUENCY WITH WHICH IT TAKES MORE THAN ONE DAY FOR A LARGE ORDER 
B ~ o m  INTO LOTS TO BE EXECUTED COMPLETELY 
Percentage of 
Respondents 
3.3 
34.0 
22.0 
32.7 
5.3 
2.7 
The length of time typically taken to implement an investment decision in the 
marketplace more directly reveals a willingness to trade patiently. The survey 
questioned the frequency with which more than one day is taken to execute an 
order completely when the order is broken into smaller lots to be executed over 
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Table 16: Time Qpically Given By Portfolio Manager To Trader To Implement 
A Large Order (25% Of Average Daily Trading Value Or More) 
Other 5 3.3 5 3.3 
No Answer 10 6.6 8 5.3 
Table 17: Frequency With Which Large Orders (100,000 Shares Or More) Are 
Broken Into Smaller Lots For Separate Executions Over An Extended Period Of 
Time. 
time (Table 18). While only 3% answered "never," 44% said that they frequently 
or regularly broke their orders into smaller lots for execution over time. 
Never 
1-9% of Orders 
10-19% of Orders 
20% or More of Orders 
Don't Know/Not Sure 
No Answer 
WHEN DO YOU PREFER TO PLACE YOUR ORDWS? 
Turning to the question of when orders are placed, the respondents expressed 
clear preferences for trading at different times during the day mble  19). Traders 
Number of 
Respondents 
8 
19 
2 1 
93 
5 
4 
Percentage of 
Respondents 
5.3 
12.7 
14.0 
62.0 
3.3 
2.7 
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Table 18: Frequency With Which It Takes More Than One Day For A Large Order 
Broken Into Lots To Be Executed Completely 
preferred the half hourjust following market opening to the actual market opening: 
44% said that 9:31-10:00 am. was their most preferred time to place an order, 
compared to 27% who most preferred the actual market opening. Traders also 
preferred the half-hour period immediately prior to market close as compared to 
the actual closing time: 23% said the 3:31-3:59 period was "most preferred," 
compared to 8% who most preferred the actual closing time to place their orders. 
The survey did not ask for the reasons behind these preferences. Presumably, the 
uncertainty concerning price determination at the open lead many to prefer the 
9:31-10:00 a.m. period; and the uncertainty concerning price, and perhaps the 
ability to trade at all, caused many of them to find the close least preferable, and 
the 3:31-359 period less preferable than the 9:31-10:OO period. 
Recognizing that the periods are not of equal length, one might expect from the 
responses that the pattern of trading over the day would be "U" shaped, as indeed 
it has been observed to be by, for instance, McInish and Wood (1990).1° The 
questionnaire did not ask, however, the frequency with which orders were delayed 
so that their arrival might be harmonized with the time of the day the respondent 
felt to be most desirable. 
V. THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE ELECTRONIC TRADING SYSTEMS 
.The emergence of alternative electronic markets in recent years has given buy- 
side traders new opportunities to receive timely executions at reasonable cost. 
Respondents were asked about the frequency with which they use these systems 
(e.g., NYSE after hours Sessions 1 and 2, Instinet's crossing session and continuous 
market, POSITS crossing sessions and AZX's call market), and their motives 
for using them (e.g., lower trading costs, the ability to trade anonymously). The 
'Osee McInish and Wood (1990). 
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Table 19: When Do You Prefer To Place Your Orders? 
respondents also were asked whether or not they felt the benefits of electronic trade 
execution outweigh the disadvantages, how satisfied they are with the alternative 
systems, and what would get them to use the alternative systems more (e.g., if they 
gave higher execution rates, if they allowed trading at more convenient times, and 
if the respondents' did not have soft dollar arrangements). 
Table 20 shows that use of the alternative systems is limited. Use of these systems 
is similar for Listed and for NASD stocks, except for Instinet's continuous market 
which is used more for NASD stocks. 
M m  FORTRADING ON THE ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS 
Of particular interest are the respondents' motives for trading on electronic systems 
(Table 21). The considerations that were rated "important" are: reduced market 
impact (47%), lower bid-ask spreads (47%), better liquidity (41 %), lower general 
transaction cost (39%), the ability to trade anonymously (38%). and the ability to 
have greater control of the negotiation process (33%). 
WHAT Emm DOES THE ANONYMITY OFFERED BY ELECTRONIC TRADING SYS- 
. m s  HAVE ON YOUR F~CU?ION ABILITY? 
Nearly half of the traders expressed the opinion that the anonymity offered by the 
alternative electronic trading systems improves their execution ability (Table 22). 
Less than 1% think that it worsens it. On the other hand, 34.0% of the respondents 
said they did not know what the effect would be or they did not answer the question. 
Table 20: How Often Do You Use The Following Alternative Electronic Trading 
Systems? 
'The indication NA stands for "No Answer". 
Listed Stocks 
NYSE Session 1 
NYSE Session 2 
Instinet Crossing 
POSIT 
AZX 
Instinet Continuous 
NASD Stocks 
Instinet Crossing 
POSIT 
AZX 
Instinet Continuous 
Never 
86.7 
90.0 
63.3 
60.0 
78.7 
52.7 
62.7 
62.7 
78.0 
49.7 
1-9% 
6.7 
4.7 
22.7 
22.7 
13.3 
28.0 
16.7 
20.7 
12.0 
14.7 
10-19% 
0.7 
0 
2.7 
4.7 
0 
4.7 
6.7 
3.3 
0 
11.3 
30% ormore 
1.3 
0 
5.3 
5.3 
2.0 
4.0 
5.3 
4.7 
2.0 
14.7 
20-2996 
0.7 
0 
2.0 
3.3 
1.3 
6.7 
4.7 
3.3 
1.3 
6.0 
Don't Know 
1.3 
2.0 
0.7 
1.3 
0.7 
0.7 
0 
0.7 
0.7 
0 
NAa 
2.7 
3.3 
3.3 
2.7 
4.0 
3.3 
4.0 
4.7 
6.0 
4.0 
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Table 21: Motives For Trading On The Electronic Systems 
Table 22: What Effect Does The Anonymity Offered By Electronic Trading Sys- 
tems Have On Your Execution Ability? 
Do You B m  THAT THE BENEFITS OF ELECI-RONIC TRADE EXECUTION OUT- 
WEIGH THE DISADVANTAGES OR THAT THE DISADVANTAGES OUTWEIGH THE 
BENEFITS? 
Improves it 
Has no Effect 
Worsens it 
Don't Know 
No Answer 
Table 23 shows that a large majority of respondents (67%) believe that the benefits 
of electronic trade execution outweigh the disadvantages. Only 16% of the traders 
expressed the opinion that the disadvantages of electronic execution outweigh its 
benefits. 
Number of 
Respondents 
63 
35 
1 
27 
24 
Percentage of 
Respondents 
42.0 
23.3 
0.7 
18.0 
16.0 
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Table 23: Do You Believe That The Benefits Of Electronic Trade Execution Out- 
weigh The Disadvantages Or That The Disadvantages Outweigh The Benefits? 
SATISFACTION OF USERS WITH THE DIFFERENT ALTERNATIVE WING SYSTEMS 
Benefits Outweigh the 
Disadvantages 
Disadvantages Outweigh the 
Benefits 
No answer 
Table 24 shows the degree of satisfaction with the alternative trading systems. 
Among these, the least satisfaction was expressed for AZX (29%). It is not sur- 
prising that 46% of AZX's customers are not satisfied: the AZX market is called 
at 5 p.m., liquidity is insufficient, and execution rates are low because aggregate 
-order flow is sparse. One would expect that satisfaction with these alternative 
markets would be considerably greater if they were integrated better with the ma- 
jor trading systems. We also note that there was widespread dissatisfaction with 
NYSE's Sessions 1 and 2. However, a substantial majority (79%) were satisfied 
with Instinet's continuous market. 
WHAT WOULD GET YOU TO USE THE ALTERNATIVE TRADING SYSTEMS MORE 
If clear motives exist for trading on electronic systems, why aren't the systems 
used more heavily? ITG's POSIT, Instinet's crossing network, and the Arizona 
StockExchange's AZX each batch orders for multilateral execution at a single time 
at a single price; if institutional asset managers are willing to forgo immediacy, 
why aren't these systems particularly attractive to them? The survey asked the 
question, Wha t  would get you to use the alternative trading systems more?" The 
results are in Table 25. 
Not surprisingly, 55% said that they would use the alternative systems more if 
-they gave higher execution rates. This is consistent with the reality that a lack of 
order flow is a major impediment to the success of any trading system (and with 
the adage, "order flow attracts order flow"). Second on the list, 35% indicated that 
they would use the systems more if they did not have soft dollar arrangements (that 
is, soft dollar arrangements appear to be an impediment to change). A total of 3 1 % 
claimed they would use the alternative markets more if they allowed trading at more 
Number of 
Respondents 
101 
24 
25 
Percentage of 
Respondents 
67.3 
16.0 
16.7 
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Table 24: Satisfaction Of Users With The Following Alternative Trading Systems 
Table 25: What Would Get You To Use The Alternative Trading Systems Morea 
Instinet Continuous 
"Note that columns add to more than 100% because some mpondena have checked more than 
one category. 
29.2% 
56 
78.9% 
They Gave Higher Execution Rates 
You Didn't Have Soft Dollar 
Arrangements 
They Allowed Trading at More 
Convenient Times 
You Knew More About Them 
Other 
None of the Above 
convenient times (presumably during the day rather than after hours), and 20% 
responded that they would use them more if they knew more about them (which 
suggests some continuing lethargy on the part of some institutional investors). 
25.0% 
9 
12.7% 
Number of 
Respondents 
82 
53 
47 
30 
7 
47 
45.8% 
6 
8.5% 
Percent of 
Respondents 
54.7 
35.3 
31.3 
20.0 
4.7 
31.3 
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Table 26: Distribution of Respondents by Institution 
VI. THE SAMPLE OF RESPONDENTS 
AND THEIR REASONS FOR TRADING 
Independent Investment Management F i  
Subsidiary of Bank or Brokerage Firm 
Mutual Fund 
Internally Managed Pension Fund 
Other 
Total 
A total of 825 questionnaires were mailed to 125 members of the TraderForum 
and to 700 non-members. A total of 150 responded. These include approxi- 
mately 90 TraderForum members and 60 non-members." Thus, the response was 
72% of TraderForum members and 8.6% of non-members. In terns of our total 
respondents, 60% were TraderForum members and 40% were non-members. 
The questionnaires were filled out by the equity trader at each institution. In 
some of the smaller institutions the trader may also be an asset manager. Re- 
spondents were asked the total value of their organization's equity assets under 
management. A total of 135 out of the 150 answered. The estimated amount of 
equity under management was $1.54 trillion.12 This represents approximately half 
the managed equity assets13 The distribution of the respondents, according to the 
type of institution, is shown in Table 26. 
Table 27 shows the reasons for trading stated by the respondents in descending 
order. The primary reasons are stock specific fundamental issues (79%), internally- 
generated research (68%), reassessment of portfolio structure (47%), bargain- 
hunting (37%). and profit taking (36%). 
l l ~ e m b e r s  automatically receive the =port while non-members must send in a card to receive the 
report. We expect that virtually all non-members who took the time to fill out the questionnaire would 
want to receive the repon Thus the number of non-membezs is inferred from the number of cards that 
wen received. 
120ut of the 150 respondents. 128 respondents repoxted a total of $1.316.42 billion of equity under 
management and 22 gave no answer. Extrapolating to the total of 150. we estimate the total assets 
under management of the mpondents of the questionnaire at $1.54 trilIion. 
13~otal equity assets in the US at the end of 1992 were $5.5 trillio- ( F h  ofFundt Codcd Tnbk s. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Resuve System. Washington. D.C.). It is estimated that 60% of 
these an managed, so that managed equity assets are $3.3 trillion. Thus. our survey covers about 50% 
of all managed equity assets. 
Number of 
Respondents 
69 
53 
14 
9 
5 
150 
Percentage of 
Respondents 
46.0 
35.3 
9.3 
6.0 
3.3 
100 
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Table 27: Why Do You Trade? 
"The indication NA in the top nght hand comer stands for "No Answef. 
MI. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ACTIVE AND PASSIVE TRADERS 
One of the interesting questions for which the responses to our questionnaire pro- 
vide an answer is whether significant differences exist in the trading behavior of 
active traders in comparison with passive traders. In particular, we are interested to 
see if these two groups have reported differences in what they consider an immedi- 
ate trade, on the willingness to trade patiently, on motives for trading in electronic 
?ystems, on the effects of anonymity, or in their reasons for trading in general. 
The answers of active and passive traders to many questions were similar. 
However, in some questions their answers could easily be differentiated. We 
summarize below the responses in which active and passive traders showed clear 
 difference^.'^ 
l4Nl Tables in this section an numbered Nb where N is the number of the comsponding table 
presented earlier that summarized responses to the same question by all  participants. 
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Table lb: Time In Which You Consider A Trade To Be Immediate: Differences 
Between Active And Passive Traders 
Table lb shows that the time horizon appears to be a bit shorter for active than 
for passive traders, as one might expect. At the short end of the scale, 76% of the 
active traders checked 10 minutes or less, versus 50% of the passive traders. At 
.the long end of the scale, 3% of the active traders checked one day versus 25% of 
the passive traders. 
TabIe 2b shows a tendency for passive traders to be more willing to trade 
patiently: 46% of the passive traders said they would be "very willing:' versus 
31% of active traders. No passive traders indicated they would be not willing 
at all or not very willing versus 10% of active traders. This is consistent with 
expectations. Trading on news implies a need for immediacy on the part of active 
traders, and seeking to minimize transaction costs implies patient trading on the 
part of passive traders. But again, the difference between the two groups is not 
.large. 
Table 12b distinguishes between active and passive traders on the issue of 
concern about information leakage. Despite the general similarity, a substantial 
percentage (33%) of passive traders are not concerned at all about information 
leakage compared to 8% of active traders. 
Table 13b shows that passive traders are much more likeIy never to demand 
capital from a broker (33% versus 17% for active traders). Further, none of the 
passive traders regularly or frequently demand capital from a broker, while 8% of 
the active traders do. 
. Table 21b shows the differences between active and passive traders in their mo- 
tives for trading on electronic systems. Among passive traders, lower transaction 
costs are the primary motivation (75.0%); this motive was indicated by 42.9% of 
active traders. Active traders are motivated by a variety of other reasons. Reduced 
market impact and lower spread costs are the primary reasons for active traders, 
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Table 2b: Willingness To Trade Patiently To Reduce Execution Costs: Differences 
Between Active And Passive Traders 
[ No Answer I 2 I 1.7 0 0 
Table 12b: Concern About Information Leakage When A Broker Is Called: Dif- 
ferences Between Active And Passive Traders 
indicated by 52.9% and 52.1% respectively. Each of these motives was indicated 
by only 25% of the passive traders as a primary motive. 45.4% of the active traders 
indicated better liquidity as a primary motive, in contrast with 20.8% of the passive 
traders. Similarly, anonymity was indicated by 42.9% of active traders as a motive, 
and only by 16.7% of passive traders. Finally, greater control of the negotiation 
process was indicated by 36.1% of the active and 20.8% of the passive traders. 
- Table 22b shows that more active than passive traders believe that the anonymity 
offered by electronic trading systems improves their execution ability. This opinion 
is expressed by 46% of the active traders and 25% of the passive traders. 
Table 13b: Frequency With Which Capital Is Demanded From A Broker For 
Transactions Of 10,000 Shares Or More: Differences Between Active And Passive 
Traders 
Never 
Rarely (1-24% of 
Trades) 
Sometimes (25-49% 
of Trades) 
Regularly (50-74% 
of Trades) 
Frequently (75- 
100% of Trades) 
Don't Know1 
Not Sure 
No Answer 
Active Traders 
Number of 
Respondents 
20 
65 
19 
5 
5 
4 
1 
Passive Traders 
Percentage of 
Active Traders 
16.8 
54.6 
16.0 
4.2 
4.2 
3.4 
0.8 
Number of 
Respondents 
8 
13 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Percentage of 
Passive Traders 
33.3 
54.2 
12.5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
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Table 21 b: Motive For Trading On The Electronic Systems: Differences Between 
Active And Passive Traders 
Table 23b shows that a larger percentage of active than passive traders believe 
that the benefits of electronic trade execution outweigh its disadvantages. This 
was expressed by 71% of active traders, compared with 46% of passive traders. 
Table 25b shows significant differences between active and passive traders in 
the reasons that would make them use the alternative trading systems more. Active 
traders (61%) would use the electronic trading systems more if the systems gave 
higher execution rates. Only 21% of passive traders indicated this. Similarly, 36% 
-of active traders, in contrast with 25% of passive traders, indicate that they would 
use more such systems if they did not have soft dollar arrangements. If systems 
were available at convenient times, 35% of active traders, in contrast with 13% of 
passive traders, indicate that they would use such systems more. Finally, 22% of 
active traders, in contrast with 8% of passive traders, indicate that they would use 
these systems more if they knew more about them. 
Reduced 
Market 
Impact 
Lower 
Spread 
Costs 
Better 
Active Traders 
Number of 
Respondents 
Who Rated 
Motive 
Important 
63 
62 
Passive Traders 
Percentage 
of Active 
Traders 
52.9 
52.1 
Number of 
Respondents 
Who Rated 
Motive 
Important 
6 
6 
Percentage 
of Passive 
Traders 
25 .O 
25.0 
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Table 22b: What Effect Does The Anonymity Offered By Electronic Trading 
Systems Have On Your Execution Ability? 
Table 23b: Do You Believe That The Benefits Of Electronic Trade Execution 
Outweigh The Disadvantages Or That The Disadvantages Outweigh The Benefits? 
Table 26b distinguishes between active and passive traders in the distribution 
of the respondents according to the type of institution where they are more likely 
lo  trade. Among active traders, the majority (5 1%) are in independent investment 
management firms, while 34% trade for a subsidiary of a bank or a brokerage h. 
The roles are reversed among passive traders: the majority (54%) of passive trader 
respondents trade for a subsidiary of bank or a brokerage firm, while 29% is in 
independent investment management firms. 
Table 27b below shows that the most important reasons to trade for active 
traders concern their evaluation of fundamental information concerning individual 
stocks. Most respondents (87%) indicated that they frequentIy trade because of 
stock specific, fundamental issues; and 74% indicated that they frequently trade 
because of internally generated research. Interestingly, passive traders also trade 
for these reasons, though not as much as the active traders. Only 58% of passive 
- 
Benefits 
Outweigh the 
Disadvantages 
Disadvantages 
Outweigh the 
Benefits 
No Answer 
Active Traders 
Number of 
Respondents 
84 
19 
16 
Passive Traders 
Percentage 
of Active 
Traders 
70.6 
16.0 
13.4 
Number of 
Respondents 
11 
5 
8 
Percentage 
of Passive 
Traders 
45.8 
20.8 
33.3 
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Table 25b: What Would Get You To Use The Alternative Trading Systems More: 
Differences Between Active and Passive Tradersa 
'Note that columns add to more than 100% because some respondents have checked more than 
one category. 
traders frequently traded because of stock specific fundamental issues, and 21% 
-because of internally generated research. On the other hand, 33% of the passive 
traders traded to trace a market index versus 8% of active traders. And 33% of 
passive traders traded because of fund redemptions or other cash flow reasons 
versus 19% of active traders. 
In some respects the two groups are quite similar: 39% of active traders fre- 
quently trade for profit taking compared to 25% for passive traders; 38% of active 
traders trade for bargain-hunting purposes compared to 38% of passive traders; and 
74% of active traders infrequently trade because of chartist signals compared to 
75% for passive traders. Overall, the active and passive traders differ in emphasis, 
'but not by as much as expected. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This paper has presented an assessment of the demand for immediacy by buy-side 
institutional equity traders that we surveyed. The 150 surveys that were returned 
clearly indicate that an appreciable number of the respondents do trade patiently. 
This is not surprising in light of the size of trades that the institutions commonly 
seek to make, and of the costs to them of obtaining immediacy in a continuous 
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Table 26b: Distribution of Respondents by Institution: Differences Between Ac- 
tive and Passive Traded 
ONote that columns add to more than 100% because some respondents have checked more than 
one category. 
Independent 
Investment 
Management 
Firm 
Subsidiary 
of Bank or 
Brokerage 
Firm 
Mutual 
market. Their orders commonly exceed the average daily trading volume for a 
stock, the large orders are commonly broken into smaller pieces, and the smaller 
pieces often take a day or more to be executed completely. The respondents were 
also concerned about losing anonymity to sell-side brokerfdealers. 
These findings have a major implication for market structure. Increasingly, 
electronic technology is making it possible for institutional buy-side participants to 
meet each other directly in a disintermediated environment. This can be done most 
effectively with batched (i.e., call market) trading arrangements, which establish 
place and time meeting points. A perceived limitation of call market trading is that 
it does not supply immediacy to participants. This is true, however, only if call 
markets are used in place of continuous trading, rather than along with continuous 
trading, as we recommend. 
However, immediacy per se does not appear to be urgently sought by many 
buy-side asset traders. This suggests that, if both call and continuous markets 
were readily available to participants, the order flow directed to the calls would, 
indeed, be appreciable. The bottom line is that providing electronic call market 
trading would be desirable for an appreciable number of institutional investors. 
Internally 
Managed 
Pension 
Fund 
Other 16.7 
Active Traders 
Number of 
Respondents 
61 
40 
Passive Traders 
Percentage 
of Active 
Traders 
51.3 
33.6 
Number of 
Respondents 
7 
13 
Percentage 
of Passive 
Traders 
29.2 
54.2 
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Table 27b: Why Do You Trade? Differences Between Active and Passive Traders 
'The indication NA stands for "No Answer". 
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